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REPLY ARGUMENT

A. Idaho Is a Strict Liability State in More Ways than One,
The Defense opens its response argument with this declaration: '·Idaho has only adopted the
concept of strict liability in cases dealing with the seller of a defective product to a consumer," (Res.
Br. P. 10).
Actually, Idaho recognizes strict liability in a myriad of circumstances. For example, Idaho
recognizes strict liability at common law of a bailee for the misdelivery of goods. Quinto v.
1Willwood Forest Products, Inc., 130 Idaho 162, 938 P.2d 189 (1997).

Idaho recognizes strict liability at common law of a corporation for the crimes of its agent.
State v. Adjustment Dep 't Credit Bureau. Inc., 94 Idaho 156, 158-59, 483 P.2d 687, 689-90 (1971).

Idaho recognizes strict liability at common law for commercial carriers who fail to safely
transport goods. lvfclntosh v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 17 Idaho 100, 105 P.66 (1909).
Idaho recognizes strict liability at common law for livestock dealers who fail to pay for
purchased cattle. US Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle Co., 92 Idaho 889, 452 P.2d
993 (I 969).
Under Idaho Code § 6-320 Idaho recognizes strict liability for a landlord who fails to keep
the premises safe for tenants. (Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70, 233 P.3d 1 (2008)).
Under Idaho Code§ 6-210 Idaho recognizes strict liability of a parent for harm done by a
minor child.
Under Idaho Code§ 25-2806 Idaho recognizes strict liability of an owner of a dog that injures
poultry or livestock.
In the criminal realm, Idaho recognizes strict liability for injury caused by a defendant guilty
of aggravated DUI, LC.§ 18-8006. State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 106 P.3d 436 (2005); Idaho
recognizes strict liability without criminal negligence for failure to affix illegal drug stamps. State
v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199,204, 75 P.3d 1209 (Ct. App. 2003); for vehicular manslaughter,
Haxforth v. State, 117 Idaho 189, 786 P.2d 580 (1990); for statutory rape, State v. Stffjler, 117 Idaho

405,410, 788 P.2d 220 (1990); for sale of securities when not licensed, State v. lvfontgomery, 135
Idaho 348, 17 P.3d 292 (2001); and for driving without a valid driver's license. State v. Taylor, 139
Idaho 402, 80 P.3d 338 (2002).
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An employer is also strictly liable for statutory penalties for failure to secure payment for
workers compensation. Heese v. A & T Trucking, l 02 Idaho 598, 63 5 P .2d 962 (1981 ).
Last, and most importantly, Idaho recognizes common law strict liability, and strict premises
liability, in dogbite cases when an ov.ner or harborer of a dog knows or ought to know the dog will
cause injury. J;fcClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass 'n. 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909).
In ,'vicClain the Idaho Supreme Court declared:

If domestic animals, such as oxen and horses, injure any one,[ sic] in person or
property, if they are rightfully in the place where they do the mischief, the owner of
such animals is not liable for such injury, unless he knew that they were accustomed
to do mischief; and, in suits for such injuries, such knowledge must be alleged and
proved, for, unless the owner knew that the beast was vicious, he is not liable. If the
owner had such knowledge, he is liable.
104 P. at 1016.
Although the wording is not word-for-word exactly the same, the sentiment of the declaration
oflaw is identical to that of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 513 (1977):
The possessor of a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal who
keeps it upon land in his possession, is subject to strict liability to persons coming
upon the land in the exercise of a privilege whether derived from his consent to their
entry or otherwise.
The sentiments of both statements are identical. It doesn't matter whether Zoey was behind
a gate where she belonged. It wouldn't matter if the gate had been put up to keep Zoey from biting
people, although it wasn't. It was erected to keep Mary's Shih Tzu from urinating on the living room
carpet. It doesn't matter if Steve Boswell was there as an invitee or a licensee.
Under either the declaration of law in lvfclain, or the declaration of law in the Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 513 (1977), the outcome is the same. The harborer of the dog is strictly liable
to anyone coming onto the property whether invitee or licensee if the dog is knovvn to bite.
The Defense's opening declaration, and twice more repeated in their brief, is: "Idaho has only

adopted the concept of strict liability on cases dealing -with a seller of a defective product to a
consumer," "Again. the only time strict liability has been allowed in Idaho is in products liability
cases," and "The District Court properly followed Idaho law, which does not recognize strict
liability in cases other than products liability.'' But such is not the law in Idaho.
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Some matters in the law just lend themselves to the application of strict liability. Harboring
a child who destroys others' property is one of them. (J.C.§ 6-210). Harboring a dog that injures
others· chickens and sheep is another. (LC.§ 25-2806). And harboring a dog that bites other people's
hands is another. (A.fcClain. supra.).
B. Idaho Law on Domestic Animals Is Broad Enough to Cover Dogbite.
Since the declaration oflaw from AfcC!ain speaks only of a dog "rightfully in the place where

they do the mischief, the Defense adheres to the view that it is not possible to extrapolate an Idaho
position on dogbite law irrespective of whether or not the dog is ·'rightfully in its place." Plaintiffs
hold to the opposite view. If, as the Restatement says, and as AkClain says: a dog owner is strictly
liable for a mischievous dog when the dog is in its rightful place: then a fortiori, an owner who
knows a dog will bite is also strictly liable whether the dog is at home or elsewhere. Just as the

Restarement says:
(1) A possessor a domestic animal that he knmvs or has reason to know has
dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is subject to liability for harm done by
the animal to another, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it from
doing the harm.

Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 509 (1977).
And just as the newer Restatement says:
An ovvner or possessor of an animal that the o,vner or possessor knows or has reason
to know has dangerous tendencies abnormal for the animal's category is subject to
strict liability for physical harm caused by the animal if the harm ensues from that
dangerous tendency.

Restatement (Third) of Torts, Phys. & Emot. Harm,§ 23 (2010).
The AkC!ain declaration, the Restatement (Second) declarations on premises liability and
dogbite liability, and the Restatement (Third) declaration on dogbite liability are also completely
consistent with the Idaho Code § 25-2805(b) which provides:
Any dog which, when not physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or
otherwise injures any person who is not trespassing, is vicious. It shall be unlawful
for the owner or for the owner of premises on which a vicious dog is present to
harbor a vicious dog outside a secure enclosure. A secure enclosure is one from
which the animal cannot escape and for which exit and entry is controlled by the
owner of the premises or owner of the animal.
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Just like AfcCiain,just like the Restatements. the Idaho Code does not distinguish between
dogbite injuries to licensees or invitees

only trespassers. The argument over invitee vs. licensee is

the proverbial red herring. The Idaho Code does not excuse dogs ·'in their rightful place.'· A '·secure
enclosure" is the only insurance for the owner of a vicious dog. What constitutes a secure enclosure

is a question of fact appropriate for a jury to decide. It is not appropriate to dispose of on summary
judgment.

C. Silence on the Law Does Not Mean the Defense Prevails.
The law in Idaho, at least until novv, has never been if the Plaintiff cannot cite to Idaho

precedent the Defense automatically prevails. One reason this Court has adopted the Restatement

237 times out of the last 240 the Restatement on Torts has been considered is because Idaho doesn't
always have a prior decision directly on every point of law. That does not mean, that the Plaintiff
has no cause of action due to lack of precedent.
Assuming, arguendo, we ignore AfcClain; we assume AfcClain is not directly on point, or
that its statement of the law is dicta, it does not follow that Idaho rejects strict liability for repeat
offender canines. It does not follow that Idaho rejects the Restatements. It does not follow that
Idaho rejects the majority view held by other states. Even assuming 1\i1cClain is insufficient in itself
to substantiate the positive, that does not automatically establish the negative. At least Plaintiffs
have one case in their favor. Defendants have none.
Idaho law is not silent on the liability of an owner of a dog that is kno"'n to do mischief.
lvfcClain. Just as the Defendants' err in declaring that Idaho only recognizes strict liability is in the

case of products liability, Defendants also err in declaring ·'the law is well settled that there is no
strict liability in dogbite cases in Idaho." (Res. Br. P. 33. 1, 1)

The Defense believes that because the AfcClain case involved a large Greyhound that
trespassed onto a race track, the principle of law enunciated in AfcClain cannot be generalized
beyond the specific facts of the case. The Defense's reading of AfcClain is so narrow that the
principles of law in that case would not apply to a dog biting, to a horse kicking, or a bull charging,
but only to a Greyhound, a large one at that, that runs onto a race track; the principle of law would
not apply if the dog was a Doberman or a German Shepherd.
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The McClain case is recognized in Supreme Court decisions of two other states as standing
for the proposition that if a dog mvner has knowledge that the dog has a propensity to do injury, the
owner is accountable. Hunt v. Hazen, 197 Or. 637, 639-40, 254 P.2d 210,211 (1953); Barber v.

Hocksrrasser, 136 N.J.L. 76, 80, 54 A.2d 458. 560 (Sup. Ct. 1947). The McClain case is recognized
by at least four secondary sources as standing for the same proposition.

Allison E. Butler, 33

Causes ofAcrion 2d 293 (Originally published in 2007) p. 52; Adam P. Karp, J.D., M.S. 38 Causes
a/Action 2d 281 (originally published in 2008) p. 42; 38 Causes of Action 2d 281 [Cumulative
Supplement] p. 5; George Ducker, Ph.D. Esq., Animal Wrongs: On Holding Animals to (and

Excusing Them from) Legal Responsibility for Their Intentional Acts. 2 ]Animal L. & Eth. 91, 121
(2007). At least the Plaintiffs have the /vfcClain case, two opinions of other state courts applying

lvfcClain, and four secondary sources. So far, neither party presents any authority to the contrary.
Even if precedent does not prove Idaho is a strict liability state, the law does not default to
conclude Idaho is not a strict liability state. The default is to address the matter as an issue of first
impression. The approach to handle a matter of first impression is set by Idaho Code § 73-116, i.e.
to follow the common law 1• The common law on dogbite is recognized as being embodied in the

Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 509 (1977). Borns v. Gannon, 2003 Wyo. 74, 70 P.3d 262,266
(2003). The Defense has yet to acknowledge the Restatements, or address them. The silence of any
authority to say Idaho is not a strict liability speaks volumes.

D. Issues of Fact Should Be Given to the Jury.

If the "Boswells failed to meet their burden of establishing their negligence, negligence per
se and premises liability claims" (Res. Br. P.33, 1. 2-3) it is because they were deprived of a trial
where thev would have had to meet that burden. Setting aside strict liabilitv for now and addressing
.,I

'--'

,.;

._,

Plaintiffs' other claims of negligence, several issues of disputed fact were treated as issues of law.
Several others were construed against the plaintiffs despite ample disputation of the Defense's
version of the facts:
Whether a canine puncture that draws blood is a meaningless "nip" or a portentous "bite"
is a question of fact for a jury. Haggblom v. City of Dillingham, 191 P.3d 991 (Alaska 2008).

1 I.C.

§73-116. Common law in force

The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent
with, the constitution or laws of the Untied States, in all cases not provided for in
these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this state.
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Likewise, irrespective of its characterization as --nipping" or ..biting" whether such
penetration of human flesh constitutes notice of a vicious propensity is a question of fact for a jury
to decide. Earl v. Piowaty, 42 A.D.3d 865, 839 N.Y.S.2d 861, (2007): Haberman v. Babai, 21
Misc. 2d 1093, 14 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1959); Rogers by Rogers v. Travis, 229 A.D.2d 879,646 ~.Y.S.2d
206 ( 1996). Whether the owner of a dog has superior knowledge to the injured victim is a question
of fact forthe jury to decide. Willis v. Neal, 179 Ga. App. 732, 34 7 S.E.2d 700 (1986).
Whether a dog was provoked before it bit is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Toney
v. Bouthillier, 129 Ariz. 402,631 P.2d 557 (1981); Bailey by Bailey v. l'vforris, 323 N.W. 2d 785

(1982): Engquist v. Loyas, 787 N.W.2d 220 (2010); Ward ex rel. Wardv. Freiderich, Not Reported
in N.W.2d (2006).
Even if we assume arguendo that it matters, Defense applies the wrong standard as to
whether Steve Boswell was a licensee or an invitee. The Defense words the standard as follows:
"Mr. Boswell was not an invitee; rather, he was a social guest or licensee, as he
rendered an incidental service to Mary Boswell he drove her home ane never
conferred any money, business of commercial benefit to Mary Steele."
In fact, the standard is actually as follows:
An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose connected
with the business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be said that the
visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary, or other tangible benefit to the
landowner.
Ball v. City of Blaclifoot, 152 Idaho 673,677,273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012).

Steve Boswell provided transportation to Mary Steele to a party she wanted to go to. He
provided her the ride home. He conferred a tangible benefit to her. More importantly, the status of
licensee or invitee is an issue of fact for the jury to decide. Willis v. Neal, 179 Ga. App. 732, 34 7
S.E.2d 700 (1986); Ambort v. Nowlin, 289 Ark.124, 70 S.W.2d 407 (1986).
Historians note well the infamous princjple that "if you repeat something frequently enough
people will sooner or later believe it." But repetition does not resolve issues of fact. The Defense
says, eleven times in their opposition brief, that Steve Boswell came at the dog with a closed fist.
Steve explained that he was only repeating the Defense's choice of words (fist) when he described
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approaching the dog with the back of his hand, fingers curled together. (R. 325) Whether Steve was
trying to threaten the dog with a poke on the nose with his fist, or, as he says, he \Vas approaching the
dog with the back of his hand, is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Although it was disputed,
that issue got treated as undisputed fact because the Defense repeated it and repeated it and repeated
it.
And on that subject, whether a closed fist is or is not a threat to a dog is also an issue of fact
for the finder of fact.
Whether the dog was growling, as stated three times in the response brief, or as Steve testified:
"the dog was not growling but barking and wagging its tail," (R.219, L.15 of page 32). is a question
of fact for the jury to decide.
Whether as stated five times, Steve Boswell reached over the fence, or as Steve testified
vehemently, he never reached over the fence, but the dog reached over the fence to take off the back
of his hand, (R. 219, L. 25-8 of pp. 31-32) is a question of fact for the jury to decide.
Credibility of witnesses is also an issue of fact for the jury to decide. Bradley v. Hendricks,
251 Ark. 733,474 S.\V.2d 677 (1972).
\v'hether, as represented six times, Defendants had no warning the dog was dangerous (despite
two previous biting incidents!), or as represented twice that Zoey was only being protective, or three
times that Steve did not think Mary or Amber did anything \\!Tong, even though Steve testified Mary
should have warned him the dog would bite (R. 230, L.4-15 of page 35), all of these issues are issues
of fact for the jury. The subjective opinion that the attack was provoked by Steve, the random
representation that Steve was bringing Mary home from a family gathering, (which he was not)
though repeated incessantly does not make them reality.
Simply put, the district court took from the jury issues that were clearly in the purview of the
jury as the trier of fact. Summary judgment should not have been granted against Steve and Karena
Boswell. All these matters are issues of fact for a jury. If reasonable persons could reach different
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences, summary judgment must be denied." (Respondents' Brief
pages 8-9, citing Smith v. A1eridianJoint School District No.2. 128 Idaho 714, 718,918 P.2d 583,587
(1996)).

F. Pocatello Municipal Code§ 604.050 E Creates a Private Cause of Action.
The Defendants' response raises a host of issues not ripe for review because they were never
ruled on by the Trial Court. \Vbile the proper way to address them is to let the District Court address
Reply Brief
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them first, as a precautionary measure Plaintiffs will address the Defenses claim that Pocatello
Municipal Code§§ 6.04.0 l 0 et seq. does not create a private cause of action. Clearly it does. Section

6.04.050 E provides:
E. Owner Liabilitv. An adult owner/custodian of a vicious animal shali be liable for
all injuries and property damage sustained by any person or domestic animal caused
by an unprovoked attack by any vicious animal, plus all costs, civil judgments or
penalties, criminal fines, final terms, and any other penalties and orders ....
(Emphasis added).

The code clearly intends to provide personal relief for injuries. Civil damages cannot be
recovered unless obtained through a civil action. The Municipal Ordinance provides both a right and
a remedy.
In 1.Weade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54, 66-67 (1969) this Court declared the
following concerning private rights of action:
The violation of a statutory provision containing a mandate to do an act for the benefit
of another, or a prohibition against the doing of an act which may he to his injury,
is generally regarded as giving rise to a liability and creating a private right of
action, whenever the other elements essential to a recovery are present. This is true
regardless of actual negligence on the part of the violator of the statute, and although
no actions are given in express terms by the statute. Jorstad v. City ofLewiston, 93
Idaho 122,456 .2d 766, filed July 9, 1969. The test whether an individual injured
by the violation of a statue may recover from the wrongdoer has been declared to
he whether the legislature intended to give such right.
Nfeade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 401-02, 462 P.2d 54, 66-67 (1969) overruled on other grounds by
Alegriav. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617,619 P.2d 135 (1980). (Emphasis added).

This standard enunciated in ,Heade fits the parameters of the Pocatello Municipal Code as
snugly as a custom made glove.

CONCLUSION
In summary, the Defense has premised its defense on several untenable premises. First, that
Idaho only recognizes strict liability in products liability cases. Second, that Idaho law is silent on
dogite liability. Third, that it is Plaintiffs' duty to produce precedent on every point of law, and if
Plaintiffs fail, the law is always in the Defense's favor. Fourth, it is the prerogative of the court to
draw legal conclusions as to whether a canine injury that draws blood is a bite or a nip; and if it's a
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nip, whether a nip counts as bad behavior or "just being protective:" whether such 'just protective·'
biting is acceptable behavior for a domestic dog; and whether reaching a hand towards a dog is, as
a matter of law, such provocation as would justify any dog in removing the hand.

And finally, the Defense relies on its reading of the Pocatello Municipal Code as giving a right
with no remedy: taking the view that a person injured by a dangerous dog has the right compensation
for injuries sustained, plus costs and civil judgments, but the same person may not pursue the civil
judgments. That is not how the law works.

The Bos,vell v. Steele summary judgment decision was not a proper application ofldaho law
or Idaho jurisprudence.
For these reasons the decision should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted, this 23rd day of October, 2014.
I

/

Keg{ A. HiggiriiJ
Attorney for Appellants
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